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By Inauguration Day, 2001, press recounts indicated that George
W. Bush almost certainly would have won the election in Florida even
if Vice President Gore had gotten everything his lawyers asked for in
court. Gore asked for inclusion of the certified recounts in Broward
County (567 votes), inclusion of the late recount in Palm Beach
County (176 votes'), and inclusion of a partial recount of all ballots in
the most heavily Democratic areas of Miami-Dade County (168
votes). That left him 193 votes short of victory (disregarding the Bush
campaign's legal objections to many of these results, and ignoring an
uncertain number of still-uncounted foreign absentee ballots). Gore's
hopes, therefore, were pinned on his remaining demand: for a manual
recount of the so-called "undervotes" in the remaining sections of Mi-
ami-Dade County.' On January 15, the Associated Press reported that
an examination of all 10,600 "undervotes" in Miami-Dade County,
conducted by newspaper reporters paired with county elections staff,
produced a net gain of six votes for Bush.4 That means Gore lost.
Paradoxically, Gore's only chance of victory in a recount would
have required rejection of his legal position. In the United States Su-
preme Court, Gore's lawyer David Boies specifically stated that there
was no legal basis for counting "overvotes,"' and the Gore lawyers
never sought recounts in more heavily Republican areas.6 But a press
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1 Some reports put this number at 215, but apparently were not correct. See Stuart Taylor,
Jr., Why the Florida Recount was Egregiously One-Sided, Natl J 3932 (Dec 23,2000) (noting how
the 176 number, not 215, was correct).
2 I put aside claims involving Nassau, Seminole, and Martin Counties that were rejected
on the merits and not revived by the Florida Supreme Court.
3 "Undervote" was the word used by the Gore legal team for ballots in which voters failed
to mark their ballots in such a way as to be readable by the counting machines. Some of these
were deliberate decisions not to cast a ballot for president. Some presumably reflected voter
confusion or problems with the voting machinery. "Overvote" was the term used for ballots in
which voters marked more than one candidate for president.
4 Review Shows Bush Gained 6 Votes in Miami-Dade County, Fla Times Union B3 (Jan 16,
2001). This means that Gore not only would not have gained votes from the recount in the re-
maining precincts in Miami-Dade, but that he was not entitled to the 168 votes the Florida Su-
preme Court certified on the basis of the partial recount. See Gore v Harris, 772 S2d 1243, 1262
(Fla Dec 8, 2000) (requiring that the results of the partial Miami-Dade recount be included in
the final tally of votes), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525 (2000) (per curiam).
5 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v Gore, No 00-949, *62-63 (Dec 11, 2000) (available
on Lexis at 2000 US Trans Lexis 80).
6 Indeed, in Gore v Harris, Gore's lawyers presented as one of the grounds for appeal the
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recount in Lake County, which went for Bush, suggests that the richest
source of additional votes for Gore would have been the "overvotes"
in Republican-dominated counties using optical scanning vote sys-
tems.7 It is unclear whether these votes would have been numerous
enough to overcome Bush's advantage.8 In any event, Gore did not
ask that they be counted, and the Florida Supreme Court did not re-
quire it.
Thus, we can now say with some confidence not only that Bush
won under the law as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court, but he would have won even if Gore had prevailed in his Flor-
ida contest action. But this knowledge has not quelled criticism of the
way the election was handled. Many Americans believe that Gore
somehow would have prevailed if only the United States Supreme
Court had allowed the Florida courts to continue the vote counting
process. Of course, many other Americans believe just as passionately
that the United States Supreme Court prevented the Florida courts
from fabricating enough votes to swing the election in Gore's favor.
Anger at the Court was fueled by the apparently partisan break-
down of the vote regarding the proper remedy. The five justices who
voted to end the recounting process were all appointed by Republican
presidents, and are regarded as the most conservative members of the
Court. To cynical eyes, that rendered their votes in favor of the Bush
legal position suspect. Of course, the charge of partisanship can be
hurled with equal force in both directions: the justices who voted in
favor of the Gore legal position were the most "liberal" of the Court,
and may have had their reasons for preferring a Gore victory. In many
eyes, the whole affair exposed the Court as an untrustworthy institu-
tion. In the words of Justice John Paul Stevens: "Although we may
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this
year's presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear.
trial court's ruling that "in a contest proceeding in a statewide election a court must review all
the ballots cast throughout the state, not just the contested ballots." Gore v Harris, 772 S2d at
1252.
7 See David Damron, Ramsey Campbell, and Roger Roy, Gore Would Have Gained Votes
in GOP Stronghold: "Overvotes" Counted Elsewhere, Orlando Sentinel Al (Dec 19, 2000). It
turns out that significant numbers of Democratic voters (a net 130 votes out of more than 6,000
discarded ballots in a heavily Republican county) both darkened the circle for Gore on the bal-
lot and wrote his name as a write-in. Machines registered these as spoiled ballots.
8 Ballots containing this error were already counted in some Florida counties. See Gore v
Harris, 773 S2d 524,535 n 26 (Fla Dec 22, 2000) (Pariente concurring). Moreover, according to
press recounts, Bush gained votes in other counties. See Alan Scher Zagier, Bush Easily Tops
Gore in Collier Hand Recount, Naples Daily News (Jan 20, 2001), available online at
<http://naplesnews.com/01/01/naples/d579324a.HTM> (visited Jan 25, 2001) (reporting net gain
of 226 votes for Bush in Collier County).
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It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of
the rule of law."9
As one who thinks that the judiciary has played an overly large
role in American public life over the past few decades, often cloaking
the judges' own opinions in a thin veneer of law, I am inclined to think
that a dose of realism about the human frailties of the judiciary is not
entirely unwelcome. But I fear that rather than stimulating serious re-
flection on the role of the Court, Bush v Gore'° may exacerbate the al-
ready corrosive cynicism about public institutions and undermine pub-
lic faith in the rule of law itself. Before we leap to conclusions about
the outcome of Bush v Gore, based on nothing but the pattern of
votes, we need to take a closer look at what the Court did.
Litigation over the election came in two rounds. In both rounds,
state or local election officials made certain decisions, which were
challenged in court either by the Gore campaign or by Democratic-
majority county boards. In the trial courts, those decisions were up-
held by local state court judges (all of them Democrats). In the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, which is composed entirely of Democratic ap-
pointees, Gore's lawyers found a more sympathetic ear. On grounds
that seemed dubious at best and disingenuous at worst, the Florida
court ruled each time in favor of Gore. That put the U.S. Supreme
Court in an awkward position. It could either allow a state court to
decide the national presidential election through what appeared to be
one-sided interpretations of the law, or render a decision that would
call its own position, above politics, into question.
I believe the Court deserves two-and-a-half cheers for its per-
formance. But the half cheer it forfeited, by failing to produce a bipar-
tisan consensus on the remand issue, continues to cast long shadows
both on the Court and on the Bush presidency.
The Court's first, unanimous ruling was masterful." It reminded
the Florida Supreme Court that its decisions were subject to review on
federal grounds and-in effect-warned the court that its handiwork
in the first round of litigation was not sufficiently attentive to 
the law.2
At the same time, the Court decided nothing of practical consequence,
and certainly could not be accused of doing anything that swayed the
electoral outcome. Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court did not
take the hint. In the second round, the Florida court-this time split 4-
3-again rendered a decision reversing a lower court decision on
9 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 542 (Stevens dissenting).
10 121 S Ct 525 (2000) (per curiam).
11 See Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per curiam).
12 Id at 473-75.
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grounds that seemed difficult to square with the law." This time, it was
more difficult for the Supreme Court to correct the error without ap-
pearing to determine the ultimate outcome. The Court nonetheless
came close. Seven of the justices -including Justice Stephen Breyer, a
Clinton appointee and former staffer to Senator Edward Kennedy,
and Justice David Souter, a Bush Senior appointee but a regular
member of the liberal faction on the Court-agreed with the five con-
servatives that the terms under which the Florida court ordered the
statewide manual recount were unconstitutional. Justice Souter called
the recounting procedure "wholly arbitrary,"'4 and Justice Breyer de-
clared it implicated "principles of fundamental fairness."" In light of
the 7-2 vote, the Court's judgment cannot plausibly be attributed to
base partisan motives. As discussed below, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment holding, while not very clearly explained in the hastily prepared
opinion, was both sensible and persuasive. This part of the opinion was
the most important, and the Court-especially Breyer and Souter-
deserve far more credit than they have received for achieving a bipar-
tisan near-consensus on so contentious a question.
But the Court split on remedy. Five justices believed that there
was not sufficient time for a remand-a decision they attributed to
state law-while two justices maintained that the case should be re-
manded to the Florida courts to try, if they could, to complete a re-
count in compliance with constitutional standards. For reasons I will
explain below, I think the decision to halt the recount was incorrect as
a matter of law (though the question is closer than the Court's critics
like to think). But perhaps more important even than law, in this case
of high constitutional moment, was the questionable judicial states-
manship of this part of the ruling. The 5-4 split created the appear-
ance-whether or not justified-that the Court voted its politics in-
stead of the law. And it deprived the new president- whichever man it
would be-of the public assurance that the results were won in the
ballot box and not in the courtroom. In effect, the Court accepted the
Florida Supreme Court's premise that a manual recount was neces-
sary, but then invoked a questionable reading of state law to say that
no such recount could even be attempted. That is an unsettling conclu-
sion. If the five justices in the majority had joined with Justices Souter
and Breyer, and remanded to the Florida courts to conduct a recount
under strict constitutional standards, the near unanimity of the deci-
sion would have been vastly reassuring to the American people. And
13 See Gore v Harris, 772 S2d at 1243.
14 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 545 (Souter dissenting).
15 Id at 551 (Breyer dissenting).
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whichever candidate had won would enter office with far greater pub-
lic confidence in the legitimacy of his election.
I. THE LEGAL ISSUES
Opponents of the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v Gore have
focused principally on the unseemliness of resolving a presidential
election by a split vote in the Supreme Court. It is not obvious why re-
solving it by a split vote in the state supreme court would be an im-
provement, and it is not obvious why the split character of the vote
impugns the majority position rather than the dissent. For the criticism
to make sense, therefore, there must be an assumption not only that
the Court was split, but that the majority was wrong. That requires a
more detailed examination of the issues. The electoral controversy
turned, in the first instance, on state law. Lurking behind the state law,
however, are certain principles of federal constitutional law, found in
Article II and the Fourteenth Amendment. I will turn first to those
principles, then to the two phases of litigation in the Florida courts
and the U.S. Supreme Court, then to the question of remedy. I will
conclude with some comments on the paradoxically self-defeating
character of much of the litigation.
II. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL OVERLAY
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides:
"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature Thereof
May Direct, a Number of Electors." By specifying "the Legislature" as
the source of state law, this Clause departs from the usual principle of
federal constitutional law, which allows the people of each state to de-
termine for themselves how to allocate power among their state gov-
erning institutions. This puts the federal court in the awkward and un-
usual posture of having to determine for itself whether a state court's
"interpretation" of state law is an authentic reading of the legislative
will.
There is no relevant legislative history explaining why the fram-
ers of the Constitution made this departure. There are, however, two
apparent functional justifications. First, the provision ensures that the
manner of selecting electors will be chosen by the most democratic
branch of the state government. The selection of presidential electors
need not be directly democratic; the legislature could select the elec-
tors itself, or even delegate that authority to a more limited body (sub-
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ject to whatever limits the Republican Form of Government Clause'6
may impose). But by vesting the authority to choose the mode of se-
lection in the most democratic branch, the framers gave that decision
a democratic bias.
Second-and more relevant for our purposes -legislatures, in
contrast to courts and executive officials, must enact their rules in ad-
vance of any particular controversy. A legislative code is enacted be-
hind a veil of ignorance; no one knows (for sure) which rules will
benefit which candidates. To use examples from Election 2000, no one
could have guessed in advance which candidate would favor strict en-
forcement of vote counting deadlines, no one could have guessed
which candidate would benefit from counting ambiguous chads and
dimples as votes, and no one could have guessed how the choice be-
tween optical scanning and punchcard voting systems would affect the
relative positions of the candidates. To be sure, this veil of ignorance is
only partially opaque: it is sometimes possible to make an educated
guess about the probable partisan consequences of particular electoral
rules. For example, favorable rules for recognizing absentee ballots
from abroad could be expected to benefit Republicans, and easy regis-
tration of voters could be expected to benefit Democrats. Partisan cal-
culation therefore can play a role. By requiring the manner of selec-
tion of electors to be specified in advance by the legislature, however,
the Constitution limits the ability of political actors to rig the rules in
favor of their candidate.
Courts and executive officials making judgments after the fact
operate behind no such veil of ignorance. The officials counting dim-
pled chads in Broward County knew precisely which candidate would
be advantaged by what rule-and indeed, how many votes they
needed to discover to put their favored candidate over the top. (By all
appearances, they changed standards until they found the one that
would produce the desired results.) The members of the Florida Su-
preme Court knew (or at least thought they knew) which candidate
would gain if they extended the vote-counting deadline. They knew
this because one candidate was asking for the extension and the other
was opposing it. And the U.S. Supreme Court knew who would be
elected president if the manual recount were put to an end. Under
such circumstances, there is inevitably the danger that a rule will be
adopted because it will produce a particular result, and then rational-
ized on other grounds.
I do not claim that all decisions made under such circumstances
are unfair. But when the decisionmaker faces a set of interpretive op-
tions, each of which is plausible in the abstract but has predictable ef-
16 US Const Art IV, § 4.
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fects on the electoral outcome-a matter as to which no decision-
maker is neutral-it would not be surprising to find that their judg-
ment is affected. And even if it is not, there will be no way to prove it
to the disappointed faction.
Thus, there is wisdom in the provision of Article II, which places
authority to set electoral rules in the institution least able to manipu-
late the rules to favor a particular candidate. Justice Ginsburg is cor-
rect that, in ordinary cases, federal courts must defer to state courts
with regard to interpretations of state law." But in this unique context,
there is a constitutionally-based federal interest in ensuring that state
executive and judicial branches adhere to the rules for selecting elec-
tors established by the legislature, and do not use their interpretive
and enforcement powers to change the rules after the fact. (I strongly
suspect that, if a state supreme court composed entirely of Republican
appointees had rendered crucial decisions of dubious legal validity,
which had delivered the state to Bush, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
and many others who complained of Supreme Court meddling, would
have seen the necessity of federal court review.)
The second relevant federal constitutional principle is that of
equal protection and due process of law." As a matter of original
meaning, it is highly questionable that the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to apply to voting rights." And there was something to
be said for Justice Frankfurter's argument that federal courts should
avoid these unanswerable political questions altogether.0 The reaction
to Bush v Gore (praise by Republicans, denunciation by Democrats)
lends weight to Frankfurter's prediction that courts could not enter
the political thicket and still maintain their apolitical character, or the
appearance of it. But those are old arguments, long rejected by the
Court. The right to vote has been recognized as a fundamental right,
and strict scrutiny is applied to ensure that every citizen within the ju-
risdiction is treated precisely equally with regard to that right.'
This principle has never been applied in the context of a presi-
dential election before, nor has the Supreme Court addressed the
problem of differing voting systems and methods of vote counting.
17 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 549 (Ginsburg dissenting).
18 US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
19 Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533,593-611 (1964) (Harlan dissenting) (thoroughly discussing
the history and language of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding it does not apply to state
voting rights); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 Harv J L & Pub Pol 103, 110 (2000).
20 Baker v Carr, 369 US 186,266-68 (1962) (Frankfurter dissenting).
21 See, for example, Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 336-37 (1972); Kramer v Union Free
School District, 395 US 621,626-27 (1969).
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But the logic of the voting rights cases strongly supports the view that
a state must use a consistent protocol for counting votes-or, at least,
that it may not be arbitrary in its recognition of legal votes. Seven jus-
tices agreed with that principle in Bush v Gore. Were it not for the
partisan context in which the issue was first addressed, I do not be-
lieve that it would be considered controversial. There is something
fundamentally wrong with a system in which one voter's ballot is rec-
ognized when the chad is merely dimpled, but an identical ballot by a
voter in the same jurisdiction is not recognized. The problem was par-
ticularly egregious in the context of Election 2000 in Florida because
of the correlation between partisan affiliation and vote-counting rules.
The Democrats were advocating a loose standard for recognition of
legal votes, as in Broward County, while the Republicans were advo-
cating a strict standard. The predictable result of a standardless re-
count, therefore, was to skew the results, as officials in Democratic ar-
eas applied the loose standard and officials in Republican areas ap-
plied the strict standard." If such a thing happened in an ordinary elec-
tion-for town clerk, for example-most lawyers, law professors, and
judges would treat this as an obvious equal protection (or due proc-
ess) violation. With this constitutional backdrop, let us look at the
various legal controversies in Bush v Gore.
III. ROUND ONE
The first round of litigation centered on two issues: whether to
permit a manual recount of the votes, and whether to enforce statu-
tory deadlines for vote counting. The Bush campaign argued that
manual recounts were not authorized by Florida law except in cases
where there was "an error in the vote tabulation."23 According to
Bush, the undervotes at issue in Florida were attributable to the fail-
ure of individual voters to comply with voting instructions, rather than
to an error in the vote tabulation. The voting machines were not de-
signed to register votes where the chad had not been removed from
the ballot card, and thus their failure to do so could not be described
as an error. This position found support in an interpretive ruling by
the Secretary of State, and later was endorsed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his concurring opinion in Bush v Gore."
The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument." While the
question was close, I think this conclusion was within the bounds of
22 See Taylor, Natl J at 3933 (cited in note 1).
23 Fla Stat Ann § 102.166(5) (West 2000).
24 121 S Ct at 537 (Rehnquist concurring).
25 See Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d 1220, 1228 (Fla Nov 21,
2000) (holding that plain language of Section 102.166(5) was contrary to the Secretary of State's
interpretation), vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471
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reasonable interpretation. The Florida Election Code provides that in
conducting a manual recount, the counting team's duty is "to deter-
mine a voter's intent in casting a ballot."2' Since a ballot cast in full
compliance with the voting instructions is highly unlikely ever to raise
questions about voter intent, this suggests that manual recounts are
expected to include some ballots that were not in compliance with the
instructions. This does not necessarily mean that dimples should be
counted-they had never been counted in previous Florida elec-
tions-but it does provide support for the Florida court's conclusion
that manual recounts should include some ballots that were rejected
by the machines.
That leaves the question of deadlines. In some elections, it does
not matter (much) how long the vote counting process takes. If the
county sheriff's term begins a few weeks late, who cares? Election of a
president is different. To begin with, in order to prevent gamesman-
ship among the states, the Constitution empowers Congress to set a
uniform date for presidential elections, and requires Congress to set a
uniform date on which the electors must meet and vote.27 In 2000, elec-
tion day was November 7, and the date on which the electors voted
was December 18. Any process of counting, recounting, and judicial
review must fit within that time frame. Moreover, the practicalities of
selecting the president-elect of the world's greatest power militate in
favor of a prompt resolution. A smooth transition to a new admini-
stration takes time, and uncertainty about who is to be the next presi-
dent is profoundly unsettling to the nation, and to the world. There is
inevitably a balance between time to check and recheck the results
and the need for a prompt and definitive resolution; but in this context
tight deadlines are rational and must be observed. (Behind a veil of
ignorance, I hazard the guess that Democrats, no less than Republi-
cans, would favor a system with tight deadlines for counting presiden-
tial ballots. Deadlines become controversial only when it is evident
which candidate might gain from having more time for recounting.)
(2000) (per curiam).
26 Fla Stat Ann § 102.166(7)(b). Oddly, the Florida Supreme Court did not cite this provi-
sion of the Election Code, instead referring to a different section, which addressed the problem
of preparing duplicate ballots when the original was damaged and unreadable. Gore v Harris,
772 S2d 1243, 1256 (Fla Dec 8, 2000) (citing Fla Stat § 101.5614(5) (2000)), revd and remd as,
Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525. This contributed to the impression that the state supreme court was
playing games with the statute. The court also cited Section 101.5614(6), which provides that a
ballot must be counted for other offices even when the vote on one office is not clear.
27 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 4 ("The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Elec-
tors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout
the United States.").
2001]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Florida state law explicitly sets a deadline of seven days after the
election for county canvassing boards to count the votes and report
the results.8 A recent amendment allowed the Secretary of State to
waive this deadline, but that decision is left to her discretion,29 and she
has determined that waivers are appropriate only in very limited cir-
cumstances. Her decision was upheld by the circuit court' (in an opin-
ion by a Democratic judge, if that matters), but it was overturned by
the Florida Supreme Court in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v
Harris.3" In an opinion that was long on words but short on clarity, the
Florida court extended the deadline for reporting and certification
from November 14 to November 26."
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the Bush
campaign made a powerful argument that this decision was contrary
to the plain language of the Florida electoral code, and hence in viola-
tion of Article II, which vests the legislature-not the courts-with au-
thority to determine the manner for choosing electors. The trouble,
however, was that by the time the case got to the High Court, the new
deadline had already passed, Governor Bush had been certified the
winner, and the legal conflict had moved on to a new phase, rendering
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris all but moot. As al-
ready noted, the Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded
to the Florida court for clarification of its legal basis." This was a pow-
erful warning to the state court that the U.S. Supreme Court was keep-
ing a close eye on its proceedings, and was prepared to intervene if it
appeared that the state court were twisting or distorting state law.
The Supreme Court focused on language in the state court opin-
ion that suggested it was relying on state constitutional law-rather
than state statutory law-for its decision." In my opinion, the more
substantive problem was not that the Florida court consulted its state
constitution in rendering the decision, but that it disregarded the plain
language of the statute and substituted a new deadline entirely of its
own making. This was obviously not "interpretation." From its denun-
ciation of "hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions"5 to its
28 Fla Stat Ann §§ 102.111,102.112 (West 2000).
29 Id § 102.112(1).
30 McDermott v Harris, 2000 WL 1714590, *1 (Fla Cir Ct Nov 17), revd as Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d 1220, vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471.
31 772 S2d 1220,1228-29 (Fla Nov 21,2000), vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471.
32 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1240.
33 Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct at 475.
34 Id at 473-74.
35 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1227.
[68:657
Two-and-a-Half Cheers
fabrication of new deadlines out of whole cloth, ' the court demon-
strated that it would not be bound by the legislature's handiwork. The
state court's claim that it was reconciling inconsistent provisions in the
statute37 was specious. To be sure, one statute said that the Secretary of
State "shall" ignore late-filed returns," and another statute said she
"may" ignore late-filed returns.39 But that provides no support for in-
terpreting the law to say that she "shall not" ignore them, or to au-
thorize the court to create its own deadline. Nor was the court correct
to say that the seven-day deadline conflicted, as a practical matter,
with the provision allowing a candidate to request a recount as late as
five days after the election.' Presumably, a candidate takes a risk if he
waits the full five days (how big a risk this is, I will address in a mo-
ment). But to call this a "conflict" is like saying a Monday morning
deadline for a student research paper "conflicts" with allowing the
student to wait until Sunday night to begin work.
More importantly, the state court ripped the deadline issue out of
its broader context. The deadline (as I read the statute) is not absolute.
It is merely the deadline for completing the pre-certification, or "pro-
test," phase. During this phase, the county canvassing boards have dis-
cretion to decide whether to conduct manual recounts. At the end of
this phase - seven days after the election - the counties must report to
the Secretary of State, who certifies the results. Certification, however,
is not the end of the road. After certification, candidates may file elec-
tion "contests," in which they challenge the decisions of the county
boards, including their mistakes in vote counting and their failure to
conduct recounts, so long as those decisions involved "rejection of a
number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result
of the election."'1
The Florida Supreme Court defended its deadline extension on
the argument hat failing to recognize votes for purposes of certifica-
tion is tantamount to "disenfranchis[ing]" the voters.2 This, the court
said, is "unreasonable, unnecessary, and violates longstanding law.
43
So it might be, if certification were the final step in the process. But it
is not. Certification is simply the legal step that leads to the "contest"
phase, during which disappointed candidates can challenge the results.
36 Id at 1240.
37 Id at 1231-36.
38 Fla Stat Ann § 102.111.
39 Id § 102.112.
40 See Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1231-33.
41 Fla Stat Ann § 102.168(3)(c) (West 2000).
42 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1237-38.
43 Id.
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By postponing certification to November 26, the state court did not
prevent "disenfranchisement"; it simply shortened the "contest" phase
by more than a week."
Ironically, in its second decision, discussed more fully below, the
Florida Supreme Court adopted an interpretation of the "contest"
phase that empowered circuit courts to conduct recounts on their own
authority, de novo, without regard to the decisions of the county
boards.5 Under this interpretation of the statutes, the certification of
the results by the county boards and the secretary have no legal con-
sequence, except to serve as "evidence,"'  on a par with the parties'
submissions. This made the court's earlier decision to extend the dead-
line truly perverse. The court added twelve days to a phase that had no
real legal significance, while shortening the time for obtaining genuine
legal relief. If, as the court held in Gore v Harris,7 the state court in the
"contest" phase can order manual recounts any time it believes they
might affect the result, then it certainly does not "disenfranchise" vot-
ers to put a quick end to the pre-certification phase of the proceeding.
In my opinion, the court got it wrong both times. In Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v Harris, the court overstated the impor-
tance of certification, and in Gore v Harris, the court understated its
importance. Properly interpreted, the pre-certification phase is one in
which county officials, under the supervision of the secretary, perform
the initial vote count, exercising discretion in such matters as whether
to conduct manual recounts. The post-certification phase is styled a
"contest" of the certified result, and is in the nature of judicial review
of an administrative decision. As in most instances of judicial review
of administrative decisions, the administrative decision enjoys a pre-
sumption of validity,"' which the contestant can overcome by a show-
ing that it was an abuse of discretion or contrary to law. This is an in-
termediate position between Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v
4 Later, in Gore v Harris, the court ruled that the Secretary had to accept county recount
results, even when they arrived after the new deadline set by the court. 772 S2d at 1262. Thus, in
effect, the court eliminated the deadline altogether.
45 Id at 1252.
46 Id.
47 772 S2d 1243 (Fla Dec 8,2000), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525.
48 See Krivanek v Take Back Tampa Political Committee, 625 S2d 840, 844-45 (Fla 1993)
("[T]he judgment of officials duly charged with carrying out the election process hould be pre-
sumed correct if reasonable and not in derogation of the law."); Boardman v Esteva, 323 S2d 259,
268 n 5 (Fla 1975) (agreeing with the trial court's observation that "[t]he election process ... is
committed to the executive branch of government through duly designated officials all charged
with specific duties.... [Theiri judgments are entitled to be regarded by the courts as presump-
tively correct."); Broward County Canvassing Board v Hogan, 607 S2d 508,510 (Fla Dist Ct App




Harris, which assumed that the certified results were conclusive, and
Gore v Harris, which treated them as legally irrelevant.
At the time, Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris
looked like a devastating blow to Bush. It gave more time to the
county canvassing boards in certain Democratic counties-all domi-
nated by Democratic officials-to "find" just enough votes to put
Gore over the top, and it shortened the time that the disappointed
candidate-probably Bush-would have to challenge these decisions
in court. The most likely scenario was that the Democratic boards
would deliver the necessary votes, and that the clock would run out
precisely at the point when Republicans were challenging judgment
calls that were made by political bodies loaded against them. The Flor-
ida courts would then choose between disregarding Republican pro-
tests (or treating them summarily) and risking Florida's representa-
tion in the electoral college. It looked very bad for Bush.
As it turned out, the decision injured Gore instead of Bush. Palm
Beach County could not complete its recount even under the new
deadline, and Miami-Dade (after a slow beginning) did not even try.
(My suspicion at the time-now corroborated by events-was that
the experienced politicians conducting the Miami-Dade recount real-
ized from the partial recount that Bush, not Gore, would benefit from
completing the recount, and thus decided not to bother.) Thus, when
the new deadline passed, Bush remained in the lead; it was Gore, not
Bush, who was in the position of contesting the certified results; and it
was Gore, not Bush, who needed more time at the end. If the contest
period had not been shortened by over a week, and all else had re-
mained the same, there might have been time to conduct a constitu-
tionally proper recount after the final decision in Bush v Gore. Like a
boomerang, Gore's strategy had reversed its course and smitten its
creator.
IV. ROUND TWO
The second round of litigation occurred after certification. On
November 26, the new deadline set by the Florida Supreme Court,
Secretary Harris certified the electoral result, finding Bush to be
ahead of Gore by 537 votes. This result was affirmed by the state trial
court, essentially on the ground that Gore had failed to show any
49 See Alan Brinkley and Michael McConnell, Dialogue: What Now?, Slate Magazine (Nov
28, 2000), available online at <http://slate.msn.com/dialogues/00-11-15/dialogues.asp?iMsg=16>
(visited Feb 22,2001).
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abuse of discretion." In the Florida Supreme Court, a 4-3 majority
held that Gore was entitled to the relief he had requested: inclusion of
results of a late recount in Palm Beach and a partial recount in Miami-
Dade, and an order requiring a recount in the rest of Miami-Dade."
The court also ordered a statewide recount of all "undervotes," which
neither party had requested.2 The court declined to set any standard
(beyond the "intent of the voter") to guide the recount.53 Moreover,
without stating any reasons, the court rejected Bush's challenges to
the recounts in Broward and Volusia Counties, and to the results of
the partial recount in Miami-Dade, all of which relied on an expansive
definition of what properly counts as a legal vote.
There were multiple problems with this ruling. To begin with, the
court treated the contests as de novo proceedings." This replaced a
process in which local governing bodies were the principal vote count-
ing authorities, subject to supervision by the Secretary of State and
56judicial review, under an abuse of discretion standard, with a process
in which the courts themselves conduct he vote counting in close
elections. That seems a significant change in the law. Moreover, the
court brushed aside a set of statutory safeguards for manual recounts,
including the requirement that "all ballots" be included in any manual
recount,7 that recounting be conducted by bipartisan panels "when
possible,' and that any disagreements regarding voter intent be re-
solved by the county canvassing boards,9 subject to judicial review.'
61Under the court-ordered recount, only undervotes would be counted,the panels were to be composed of anyone the court could find to do
50 Gore v Harris, 2000 WL 1790621, *4 (Fla Cir Ct Dec 3), revd and remd as Gore v Harris,
772 S2d 1243 (Fla Dec 8,2000), revd as Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525.
51 Gore v Harris, 772 S2d at 1262.
52 Id.
53 Id at 1252.
54 Id at 1252, 1260.
55 Fla Stat Ann §§ 102.131, 102.141(2) (West 2000).
56 Id § 97.012(1) (authority of Secretary of State); id § 102.168(1) (judicial review in contest
proceedings). On the abuse of discretion standard, see cases cited in note 48.
57 Id § 102.166(5)(c).
58 Id § 102.166(7)(a).
59 Id § 102.166(7)(b).
60 Id § 102.168(3)(e).To be sure, these statutory safeguards pertain to manual recounts or-
dered by county canvassing boards during the protest phase, and not (expressly) to recounts or-
dered by circuit courts in the contest phase. But the only statutory authorization for manual re-
counts appears in the code sections pertaining to the protest phase. There is no reason to assume
that the safeguards for manual recounts were intended to disappear in the post-certification pe-
riod. The more likely interpretation is that the court in a contest phase is limited to hearing "con-
tests" to the certified results, and if the court concludes that the county board should have con-
ducted a manual recount, it should order such relief-in accordance with the statutory proce-
dures for manual recounts pecified in Sections 102.166(5)(c) and 102.166(7).
61 See Gore v Harris, 2000 WL 1811188, *24 (Fla Cir Ct Dec 8) (Lewis).
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the job,Q party observers would be prohibited from lodging oral objec-
tions during the vote counting process, and no written record would
be kept of decisions regarding particular ballots, thus rendering ap-
peals virtually impossible." That seems a significant change in the law.
Perhaps most strikingly, the court held that the recount should be
statewide, and conducted under the supervision of a single circuit
judge.6 Neither Bush nor Gore requested this statewide recount, and
it is hard to see how the appellate court had the authority to order it.
Contest proceedings take the form of legal challenges to the decisions
of county canvassing boards, which are denominated the defendants in
the contest actions.6 How could the Florida Supreme Court order re-
view of the certified results from counties whose results had not been
contested, and which were not parties to the litigation?
Any of this could have been the basis for a persuasive finding of
an Article II violation. But the Article II argument attracted only
three votes on the U.S. Supreme Court,6' and I shall address it no fur-
ther.
The key problem with the decision turned out to be the court's
failure to specify a consistent and uniform standard for recognition of
legal votes. With some vote counters recognizing dimpled chads, and
other vote counters following more restrictive principles, there was no
way that the state-ordered recount could produce a fair and accurate
result. Moreover, by certifying the results from Palm Beach as well as
Broward and Volusia Counties, the court effectively ensured that the
statewide recount would reflect very different vote counting stan-
dards. Palm Beach treated a "dimpled chad" as a legal vote only if
there were extrinsic evidence that this was the voter's intent (for ex-
ample, if there were similar dimples for other offices on the ballot).6
By contrast, in a series of 2-1 party-line votes, the Broward County
Board recognized dimples as votes without regard to extrinsic evi-
dence of voter intent, producing, on average, more than three times as
many votes per 100 disputed ballots as were recognized in Palm
62 See id at *25.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See Gore v Harris, 772 S2d at 1261-62.
66 Fla Stat Ann § 102.168(4). See Gore v Harris, 772 S2d 524,532 (Fla Dec 22,2000) (Pari-
ente concurring) (pointing out that there is no procedure in Florida law for obtaining a statewide
manual recount).
67 See Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 533-39 (Rehnquist concurring).
68 See Tina Cassidy, Election 2000/Court Date: Democrats Plan Legal Challenge of Tallies in
3 Counties, Boston Globe A10 (Nov 27, 2000).
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Beach. In addition, the Florida Supreme Court certified the results of
the partial recount in Miami-Dade, based on an examination of all the
ballots in the most heavily Democratic precincts,'° even though the re-
count in the more Republican areas would include only the under-
votes. Gore gained 490 more votes in Broward and Miami-Dade than
he would have gained from application of the Palm Beach standard.'
That could easily have been the margin of victory, if the statewide re-
count had found a few hundred more. Remarkably, the Florida court
did not even mention Bush's challenges to these votes-let alone ex-
plain why they were being rejected.
It was no surprise, therefore, that the United States Supreme
Court stepped in. The per curiam opinion described the recount as
"inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the
fundamental right of each voter."2 Justice Souter, who voted to deny
the petition for certiorari and disagreed vehemently with the majority
on all other issues, conceded that this disparity in vote counting stan-
dards, which he described as "wholly arbitrary," was "a meritorious ar-
gument for relief."73 He stated that he could "conceive of no legitimate
state interest served by these differing treatments of the expressions
of voters' fundamental rights."7 He "would therefore remand the case
to the courts of Florida with instructions to establish uniform stan-
dards for evaluating the several types of ballots that have prompted
differing treatments."5 Justice Breyer, who like Justice Souter dis-
agreed with the decision to grant certiorari and with the remainder of
the Court's decision, concluded that the lack of uniform vote counting
standards "does implicate principles of fundamental fairness."6 He
went out of his way to note that an "appropriate remedy" would not
only entail "the adoption of a uniform standard" but also new re-
counts in Broward, Volusia, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade Counties
"whether or not previously recounted."7 This was evidently a response
to Bush's argument that the recounts in these counties had been im-
properly conducted.
69 See Mike Williams, Florida Certifies Bush Win but Court Battles Continue, Atlanta J &
Const 1A (Nov 27,2000).
70 The 135 precincts included in the recount (out of 614 precincts in the county) registered
a 74 percent vote for Gore. The county as a whole went for Gore 53 percent to 47 percent. See
John Fund, The Myth of Miami (Nov 26, 2000), available online at <http://www.opinionjoumal.
com/diary/?id=65000686> (visited Feb 22,2001).
71 For the derivation of these numbers, see Taylor, Nat] J at 3932-33 (cited in note 1).
72 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 532.
73 Id at 545 (Souter dissenting).
74 Id.
75 Id.




Were it not for the press of time, and the majority's decision not
to allow the state courts to conduct a recount under proper constitu-
tional standards, I do not believe this holding would strike many ob-
servers as controversial. It may be true that the Equal Protection
Clause typically protects against discrimination against identifiable
groups, but as recently as last year, the Court summarily affirmed the
principle that it also protects against "irrational and wholly arbitrary"
state action, even where the plaintiff does not allege that the unequal
treatment was on account of "membership in a class or group."78 And
in cases involving fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, the
Court applies strict scrutiny to all disparities, without regard to
whether the disparities reflect discrimination against any protected
group." Minor and unsystematic variances from precise population
equality for legislative districts injure no identifiable group, but none-
theless violate the Equal Protection Clause." Similarly, to treat one
voter's ballot as a legal vote, and another voter's identical ballot as
spoiled, in the same jurisdiction, for no conceivable public purpose,
certainly states a plausible equal protection claim.
Even Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg in dissent,
acknowledged that "the use of differing substandards for determining
voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems
may raise serious concerns."8 They declined to find a constitutional
violation, however, on the ground that "[t]hose concerns are allevi-
ated-if not eliminated-by the fact that a single impartial magistrate
will ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount proc-
ess."' That assurance rings hollow in the circumstances of this case,
where Leon County Circuit Judge Terry Lewis announced that he
would not set or enforce a uniform standard, where partisan observers
were not permitted to voice objections as disputed ballots were
counted, where vote counters maintained no written records of the
disposition of disputed ballots, on which an appeal to Judge Lewis
might be based, and where the pace of events would scarcely allow
him to exercise review over some sixty thousand ballots."
78 Village of Willowbrook v Olech, 120 S Ct 1073, 1074-75 (2000).
79 See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-7 at 1454 (Foundation 2d ed
1988).
80 See Karcher v Daggett, 462 US 725, 744 (1983). Of course, it could be said that the in-
jured "group" is residents of the larger districts. But that is analytically analogous to saying that
voters with uncounted votes were the injured group in Bush v Gore.
81 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 541 (Stevens dissenting).
82 Id.
83 Gore v Harris, 2000 WL 1811188 at *24-26.
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Critics make a slippery slope argument: that if different standards
for vote counting are unconstitutional, this would render the use of
different voting systems by different counties unconstitutional.4 I
think not, for two reasons. First, the Equal Protection Clause requires
equality of treatment within a jurisdiction, but not between jurisdic-
tions8' Florida law delegates authority over elections to counties, and
there is no constitutional problem if different counties adopt different
voting systems. The constitutional issue arose in this election because
the Florida Supreme Court (in my opinion erroneously, as a matter of
state law) consolidated statewide vote-counting authority in a single
jurisdiction, Leon County Circuit Court, without requiring a uniform
standard for vote counting within that jurisdiction. Second, there are
some aspects of the administration of elections that cannot be reme-
died after the fact without conducting a revote, which is a drastic rem-
edy never required in the absence of intentional fraud or other ex-
traordinary circumstances. If the use of different voting machines by
different counties raises a constitutional issue, it must be challenged
before the election, when it could be remedied. Protocols for vote
counting are an entirely different matter, since differences can easily
be remedied by institution of a uniform standard.
But even if these slippery slope arguments were more persuasive,
they would not carry the day because the bottom of the slippery slope is
not particularly unattractive. Why not require every state to adopt a
uniform vote counting system? Every voting system has its flaws, but in
ordinary cases the effects are randomly distributed. The problem in
Florida arose because the optical scanning system is predominantly
used in more Republican areas, while the punchcard system is pre-
dominantly used in more Democratic areas. Thus, the errors were not
randomly distributed. We may not know the perfect voting system, but
we could solve most of the problem by requiring that the same system
be used throughout the state. Then the random errors would not matter.
V. THE REMEDY
On the merits, then, the Court's 7-2 decision to reverse the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's decision was well founded. But the same cannot
84 See, for example, Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 541 (Stevens dissenting).
85 This is the implicit, and convincing, explanation for the holdings of San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 55 (1973) (ruling that a state's use of property
taxation for school funding did not violate the Equal Protection Clause), and Milliken v Bradley,
418 US 717, 745 (1974) (ruling that district court could not impose a multidistrict remedy in a
single district de jure school segregation situation). The ostensible explanation in Rodriguez -
that education is not a fundamental right and poverty is not a suspect class-is unconvincing. 411
US at 17-18. I cannot believe a court would hold there is no violation if a school district deliber-
ately provided. a less valuable education to poor children.
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be said of the decision not to allow the lower court to attempt a re-
count under constitutionally appropriate standards. Had the Court
majority accepted the Article II theory that the Florida court misread
Florida law in ordering a manual recount to correct individual voter
error rather than errors in vote tabulation, it would have been logical
to stop the recounting process."' But there were only three votes for
that theory of the case. Having rested the decision on the standardless
character of the recount ordered by the state court, the logical out-
come was to remand under proper constitutional standards.
The per curiam opinion explained its conclusion about the re-
mand as follows:
The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature in-
tended the State's electors to "participat[e] fully in the federal
electoral process," as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5. [772] So.2d, at -,
2000 WL 1800752 (slip op. at 27); see also Palm Beach Canvassing
Bd. v. Harris, [772] So.2d [1220], - ,2000 WL 1725434, *13 (Fla.
2000). That statute, in turn, requires that any controversy or con-
test that is designed to lead to a conclusive selection of electors
be completed by December 12.... Because it is evident that any
recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconsti-
tutional for the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to pro-
ceed.'
Sympathetic as I am to the nation's need for a resolution to the elec-
tion imbroglio, I do not find that explanation very persuasive. As a
matter of federal law, the December 12 date is not a strict deadline,
but merely a "safe harbor" date insulating electors chosen by that date
from congressional challenge. No doubt the Florida legislature hoped
to take advantage of that safe harbor, but it passed no statute
embodying that intention. Nor do the two cited Florida Supreme
Court opinions supply any authoritative pronouncement that
December 12 is the absolute deadline for state law purposes. The first
citation, to Gore v Harris, seems to be in error.m The "see also" cita-
tion, to Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, comes closer,
but is far from unambiguous."
86 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 537-38 (Rehnquist concurring). Most other Article II errors
identified by the concurring Justices could, in theory, have been corrected on remand.
87 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 533.
88 Nothing on that page, or surrounding pages, seems relevant. See, for example, Gore v
Harris, 772 S2d at 1248 (commenting on 3 USC § 5 but not describing it as an absolute deadline).
89 In this passage, the Florida court observes that it would be appropriate for the Secretary
of State to disregard late-filed returns if they are "so late that their inclusion will ... preclud[e]
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It might still be true that December 12 is the deadline under state
law. Language in support of that conclusion can be found in Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris,'O the Florida Supreme
Court's decision on remand from Bush v Gore. This decision was
handed down on December 11, the day of oral argument in Bush v
Gore, and must not have come to the justices' attention. In footnote
17, the Florida Supreme Court explained that a reasonable time to
complete a manual recount would depend on the election, and stated:
In the case of the presidential election, the determination of rea-
sonableness must be circumscribed by the provisions of 3 U.S.C.
§ 5, which sets December 12, 2000, as the date for final determi-
nation of any state's dispute concerning its electors in order for
that determination to be given conclusive effect in Congress."
Moreover, in footnote 22, the court referred to December 12 as "the
outside deadline."' These passages may not justify the Supreme
Court's decision, since the Court did not rely on them, but they indi-
cate that the Court may have reached the right result for the wrong
reason. If the Florida Supreme Court was prepared to recognize De-
cember 12 as "the outside deadline," then the same ultimate outcome
would have been reached even if the High Court had remanded for
further proceedings.
Some commentators have defended the decision to halt the re-
count on the ground that a continued recount would have produced a
constitutional crisis. That was a serious possibility, and may help to ex-
plain, even if not to justify, the Court's decision. But I am skeptical.
Let us canvass the possible outcomes, in order of their potential for
provoking a crisis. First, as now appears most probable, Bush could
have won the recount, perhaps by a wider margin. That would have
put all reasonable doubts about the election to rest. Second, as ap-
peared most likely at that juncture, there might not have been time
enough to conduct a recount under fair and consistent standards, with
opportunity for appeals, by the federal constitutional deadline of De-
cember 18. 9 From Gore's point of view, that would have been no im-
Florida voters from participating fully in the federal electoral process," and drops a footnote to 3
USC §§ 1-10. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1237 n 55.This could be
taken as a reference to the safe harbor rule of 3 USC § 5, but that would be a stretch.
90 772 S2d 1273 (Fla Dec 11, 2000) (per curiam).
91 Id at 1286 n 17.
92 Id at 1290 n 22. (I thank Professor James Blumstein for bringing these footnotes to my
attention.)
93 In her dissenting opinion in Bush v Gore, Justice Ginsburg suggested that there is no
federal deadline short of January 6, the date on which Congress meets to count the electoral
votes. 121 S Ct at 550. With due respect, I think that is plainly incorrect. Article II, § 1, cl 4 em-
powers Congress to determine the day on which the electors meet to give their votes, and states
that this "Day shall be the same throughout the United States." (emphasis added). December 18
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provement over the actual decision, except for a few days' more grief.
But it would have deflected attention-and responsibility-from the
Supreme Court, which acted as expeditiously as humanly possible, ' to
the process in Florida.
Third, if Gore had won a full and fair recount, then Congress
would have been required to choose between two competing slates of
electors. The worst scenario, I suppose, is that even after receiving in-
structions from the Supreme Court regarding constitutionally appro-
priate vote-counting standards, the Florida court had conducted a re-
count in an unfair fashion. Either of these scenarios would indeed
have produced a constitutional confrontation. A good case can be
made, however, that the Constitution and laws have designated Con-
gress-not the Court-as the arbiter of such a conflict. I do not as-
sume that all members of Congress would necessarily vote the party
line. Whether following politically contentious-but legal-
procedures would constitute a constitutional crisis is not obvious, and
might well depend on how Congress rose to the occasion.
VI. HINDSIGHT
In retrospect, one of the most remarkable features of the Elec-
tion 2000 controversy was the consistent way in which lawyers mis-
judged their clients' best interests. I have already discussed the fact
that Gore's lawyers asked for the extension of the certification dead-
line, only to be injured by the concomitant shrinkage of the contest
period. But Gore's lawyers' miscalculations went far beyond that.
They attempted to gain an advantage by confining their recount re-
quests to a few heavily Democratic counties in south Florida. They did
not request a statewide recount, presumably because they assumed
that recounts produce more votes, that the new votes would go to the
candidates in proportion to their support in the county, and thus that
recounts outside the Democratic strongholds would benefit Bush.
They did not request recounts of the "overvotes," presumably because
these would be more numerous in counties with optical scanning sys-
was so designated by statute. It would be unconstitutional for Congress to allow the electors
from a single state to give their votes on a later date. I am aware that in the 1960 presidential
election, Congress recognized electors from the state of Hawaii who had been chosen after this
deadline. That should not be treated as a precedent. In that election, the votes of Hawaii were
not necessary to the result, and on the suggestion of the losing candidate, Vice President Richard
Nixon, in his capacity as President of the Senate, were recognized as a courtesy.
94 Some attribute the timing problem to the Supreme Court's grant of a stay on December
9. But this is a red herring. The recount then underway was constitutionally defective, and would
have had to be done over, if the stay had not been granted. See Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 551
(Breyer dissenting).
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tems, which tended to be Republican. They did not seek a uniform
standard for vote counting, presumably because they benefited from a
subjective standard, which maximized their votes in Democrat-
controlled Broward and Volusia Counties, while not swelling Bush
votes elsewhere.
These tactics were, in hindsight, a mistake. First, by confining their
requests in this fashion, they fostered the cynical impression-
probably true-that they were less interested in a full and fair result
than in winning. That was bad for their public relations campaign.
Second, by failing to request a statewide recount, they postponed the
day on which the Florida courts would ultimately decide that such a
recount would be necessary, until it was too late. Third, their failure to
seek uniform standards laid the groundwork for the equal protection
problem, which ultimately invalidated their recount. Most ironically,
we now know that the selective recounts they sought would not have
been enough to put Vice President Gore over the top. Their only hope
of winning, it now turns out, was to recount the overvotes in predomi-
nantly Republican parts of the state-just what they were trying to
avoid.
The Bush legal strategy was more coherent. His lawyers and pub-
licists had a theme, and they stuck to it: Bush won the machine count,
and any attempt to supplement it by manual recounting was just an
invitation to human error or abuse. Whatever the merits of this posi-
tion, I do not think they won the public relations battle on this point.
Too many people were persuaded by the Democratic claims that votes
were not counted. Thus, in the end, when the recount was aborted,
many millions of Americans were persuaded that President-elect
Bush's victory was not legitimate. Now we know that, if the Bush
campaign had simply agreed to a limited recount of the contested
counties under a fair and uniform standard, the whole affair could
have been concluded more quickly, and Bush would have emerged as
the undisputed winner. Indeed, in Miami-Dade County, he would even
have picked up votes from the recount.
What is the moral of this story? Perhaps that even in the midst of
partisan confrontation, it is sometimes best not to pursue what ap-
pears, at the moment, to be to your candidate's maximum advantage.
If Gore's position had been a little fairer, he might have obtained the
recount he thought he deserved. If Bush's position had been a little
more accommodating, he might have obtained a more secure mantle
of leadership. The nation might have gained, as well, by the spectacle
of the two candidates yielding a little, and recognizing at least a part of
the justice in the other side's position. That would have been good
practice for the coming four years.
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